recapturing authority we suggest will only be labor lost. Perhaps, in a nightmarish vindication of Marvin Harris's cultural materialism, an anthropology of the present will only come about courtesy of a demographic transition—the mass retirement of the "elders" late in the twentieth century. The contributors to this volume and, I suspect, many other anthropologists, do not intend to be so patient.

Our industry in Santa Fe and in this volume is not only a matter of personal craft. We depended on a particular work place, the School of American Research, which hosted this seminar, and on the labors of Jonathan Haas, Douglas Schwartz, Jane Kepp, and Jane Barberousse before, during, and after the seminar. I thank them for their help and hospitality. This introduction has benefited greatly from critical readings by the other participants in the seminar and by Sidney Mintz, Jane Kepp, and Ernestine Friedl, to all of whom I am grateful. I also wish to thank the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities, which provided support during the time I wrote the original proposal for the advanced seminar, and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, which provided funding for the participants' travel.

Notes
1. For the concept of the predeceesory ethnography and ethnographer, see José Linón's paper in this volume.
2. Compare LaCapra's (1985:91) criticism of Darnton's "history in the ethnographic grain": "Darnton's binary opposition between the armchair and the archives recalls the tendentious contrast drawn by certain anthropologists between 'armchair' theorizing and fieldwork. In anthropology, this contrast has often fostered a self-mystified understanding of fieldwork as untouched by theory and in closest proximity to 'authentic' native experience—fieldwork as the virginal, all-pure 'real thing.'

Anthropology faces an unprecedented wave of challenges that require an archaeology of the discipline and a careful examination of its implicit premises. The postmodernist critique of anthropology, which is now the most vocal and direct response to these challenges in the United States, falls short of building that archaeology because it tends to treat the discipline as a closed discourse. In contradistinction, I contend that the internal tropes of anthropology matter much less than the larger discursive field within which anthropology operates and upon whose existence it is premised. A cultural critique of anthropology requires a historicization of that entire field. New directions will come only from the new vantage points discovered through such a critique.

Challenges and Opportunities
Academic disciplines do not create their fields of significance, they only legitimize particular organizations of meaning. They filter and rank—and in that sense, they truly discipline—contested arguments and themes that often precede them. In doing so, they continuously expand, restrict, or
modify in diverse ways their distinctive arsenals of tropes, the types of statements they deem acceptable. But the poetics and politics of the “slots” within which disciplines operate do not dictate the political relevance of these slots. There is no direct correlation between the “electoral politics” of a discipline and its political relevance. By “electoral politics,” I mean the set of institutionalized practices and relations of power that influence the production of knowledge from within academic: academic filiations, the mechanisms of institutionalization, the organization of power within and across departments, the market value of publish-or-perish prestige, and other worldly issues that include, but expand way beyond, the maneuvering we usually refer to as “academic politics.” Changes in the types of statements produced as “acceptable” within a discipline, regulated as they are—if only in part—by these “electoral politics,” do not necessarily modify the larger field of operation, and especially the enunciative context of that discipline. Changes in the explicit criteria of acceptability do not automatically relieve the historical weight of the field of significance that the discipline inherited at birth. More likely, the burden of the past is alleviated when the sociohistorical conditions that obtained at the time of emergence have changed so much that practitioners face a choice between complete oblivion and fundamental redirection. At one point in time, alchemists become chemists or cease to be—but the transformation is one that few alchemists can predict and even fewer would wish.

Anthropology is no exception to this scenario. Like all academic disciplines, it inherited a field of significance that preceded its formalization. Like many of the human sciences, it now faces dramatically new historical conditions of performance. Like any discourse, it can find new directions only if it modifies the boundaries within which it operates. These boundaries not only predate the emergence of anthropology as a discipline, but they also prescribed anthropology’s role (and ethnography’s ultimate relevance) to an extent not yet unveiled. Anthropology fills a preestablished compartment within a wider symbolic field, the “savage” slot of a thematic trilogy that helped to constitute the West as we know it. A critical and reflective anthropology requires, beyond the self-indulgent condemnation of traditional techniques and tropes, a reappraisal of this symbolic organization upon which anthropological discourse is premised.

Anthropology’s future depends much on its ability to contest the savage slot and the thematic that constructs this slot. The times are ripe for such questioning. More important, solutions that fall short of this challenge can only push the discipline toward irrelevance, however much they may reflect serious concerns. In that light, current calls for reflexivity in the United States are not products of chance, the casual convergence of individual projects. Neither are they a passing fad, the accidental effect of debates that stormed philosophy and literary theory. Rather, they are timid, spontaneous—and in that sense genuinely American—responses to major changes in the relations between anthropology and the wider world, provincial expressions of wider concerns, allusions to opportunities yet to be seized. What are those changes? What are these concerns? What are the opportunities?

On sheer empirical grounds, the differences between Western and non-Western societies are blurrier than ever before. Anthropology’s answer to this ongoing transformation has been typically ad hoc and haphazard. The criteria according to which certain populations are deemed legitimate objects of research continue to vary with departments, with granting agencies, with practitioners, and even with the mood shifts of individual researchers. Amid the confusion, more anthropologists reenter the West cautiously, through the back door, after paying their dues elsewhere. By and large this reentry is no better theorized than were previous departures for faraway lands.

While some anthropologists are rediscovering the West without ever naming it, what “the West” stands for is itself an object of debate, within and outside the gates of academia. The reactionary search for a fundamental Western corpus of “great texts” by many intellectuals and bureaucrats in the English-speaking world is both the reflection of a wider conflict and a particular response to the uncertainties stirred by this conflict. Interestingly, few anthropologists have intervened in that debate. Fewer even among those thought to be at the forefront of the discipline have deigned to address directly the issue of Western monopolism, with one or two exceptions (e.g., Rosaldo 1989). Even more interestingly, anthropological theory remains irrelevant to—and unused by—either side of the “great texts” debate, rhetorical references notwithstanding. Today, the statement that any canon necessarily eliminates an unspecified set of experiences need not come only from anthropology—thanks, of course, to the past diffusion of anthropology itself, but thanks especially to changes in the world and to the experiences that express and motivate these changes. Minorities of all kinds can and do voice their cultural claims, not on the basis of explicit theories of culture but in the name of historical authenticity. They enter the debate not as academics—or not only as academics—but as situated individuals with rights to historicity. They speak in the first person, signing their arguments with an “I” or a “we,” rather than invoking the ahistorical voice of reason, justice, or civilization.
Anthropology is caught off guard by this reformulation. Traditionally, it approached the issue of cultural differences with a monopoly over native discourse, hypocritically aware that this discourse would remain a quote. It is too liberal to accept either the radical authenticity of the first person or the conservative reversion to canonical truths.—hence, its theoretical silence.

Here again, silence seems to me a hasty abdication. At the very least, anthropology should be able to illuminate the myth of an unquestioned Western canon upon which the debate is premised. In doing so, it would certainly undermine some of its own premises, but that risk is an inherent aspect of the current wave of challenges: its numerous opportunities are inseparable from its multiple threats. Nowhere is this combination of threats and opportunities as blatant as in the postmodern admission that the metanarratives of the West are crumbling.

THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF REASON

Whatever else postmodernism means, it remains inseparable from the acknowledgment of an ongoing collapse of metanarratives in a world where reason and reality have become fundamentally destabilized (Lyotard 1979, 1986). To be sure, the related claim (Tyler 1986:123) that “the world that made science, and that science made, has disappeared” is somewhat premature. The growing awareness among literati that rationality has not fulfilled its promises to uncover the absolute becoming of the spirit does not alter the increasing institutionalization of rationality itself (Godzich 1986:xvi–xix). Indeed, one could argue that the spectacular failure of science and reason, judged on the universal grounds that scholars love to emphasize, serves to mask success on more practical and localized terrains into which academics rarely venture.

But if the world that science made is very much alive, the world that made science is now shaky. The crisis of the nation-state, the crisis of the individual, the crisis of the parties of order (liberal, authoritarian, or communist), terrorism, the crisis of “late capitalism”—all contribute to a Western malaise and, in turn, feed upon it (Aronowitz 1988; Jameson 1984). Philosophers reportedly asked: can one think after Auschwitz? But it took some time for Auschwitz to sink in, for communism to reveal its own nightmares, for structuralism to demonstrate its magisterial impasse, for North and South to admit the impossibility of dialogue, for fundamentalists of all denominations to desacralize religious thought. As the walls crumbled—North and South and East and West—intellectuals developed languages of postdestruction. It is this mixture of negative intellectual surprise, this postmortem of the metanarratives, that situates the postmodernist mood as primarily Western and primarily petit bourgeois.

These words are not inherently pejorative, but they are meant to historicize the phenomenon—an important exercise if we intend to have cross-cultural relevance. First, it is not self-evident that all past and present cultures required metanarratives up to their current entry into postmodernity. Second, if only the collapse of metanarratives characterized the postmodern condition, then some of the non-Western cultures that have been busily deconstructing theirs for centuries, or that have gone through megacollapses of their own, have long been “postmodern,” and there is nothing new under the sun. Things fell apart quite early on the southern shores of the Atlantic, and later in the hinterlands of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Third, even if we concede, for the sake of argument, that metanarratives once were a prerequisite of humankind and are now collapsing everywhere at equal rates (two major assumptions, indeed), we cannot infer identical reactive strategies to this collapse.

Thus, we must distinguish between postmodernism, as a mood, and the recognition of a situation of postmodernity. The acknowledgment that there is indeed a crisis of representation, that there is indeed an ongoing set of qualitative changes in the international organization of symbols (Appadurai, this volume), in the rhythms of symbolic construction (Harvey 1989), and in the ways symbols relate to localized, subjective experience, does not in itself require a postmortem. In that light, the key to the dominant versions of postmodernism is an ongoing destruction lived as shock and revelation. Postmodernism builds on this revelation of the sudden disappearance of established rules, foundational judgments, and known categories (Lyotard 1986:33). But the very fact of revelation implies a previous attitude toward such rules, judgments, and categories—for instance, that they have been taken for granted or as immutable. The postmortem inherent in the postmodernist mood implies a previous “world of universals” (Ross 1988:xii–xiii). It implies a specific view of culture and of culture change. It implies, at least in part, the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century Europe.

In cross-cultural perspective, the dominant mood of postmodernism thus appears as a historically specific phenomenon, a reaction provoked by the revelation that the Enlightenment and its conflicting tributaries may have run their course. This mood is not inherent in the current world situation, but neither is it a passing amibiance, as many of the postmodernists' detractors would have—even though it ushers in fads of its own. It is a mood in the strong sense in which Geertz (1973b:90) defines
religious moods: powerful, persuasive, and promising endurance. But contrary to religions, it rejects both the pretense of facuality and the aspiration to realistic motivations. It seeks a “psychoanalytic therapeutic” from the “modern neurosis,” the “Western schizophrenia, paranoia, etc., all the sources of misery we have known for two centuries” (Lyotard 1986:125–26).

“We,” here, is the West, as in Michael Jackson and Lionel Ritchie’s international hit, “We Are the World.” This is not “the West” in a genealogical or territorial sense. The postmodern world has little space left for genealogies, and notions of territoriality are being redefined right before our eyes (Appadurai, this volume). It is a world where black American Michael Jackson stars an international tour from Japan and imprints cassettes that mark the rhythm of Haitian peasant families in the Cuban Sierra Maestra; a world where Florida speaks Spanish (once more); where a Socialist prime minister in Greece comes by way of New England and an Imam of fundamentalist Iran by way of Paris. It is a world where a political leader in reggae-prone Jamaica traces his roots to Arabia, where U.S. credit cards are processed in Barbados, and Italian designer shoes made in Hong Kong. It is a world where the Pope is Polish, where the most orthodox Marxists live on the western side of a fallen iron curtain. It is a world where the most enlightened are only part-time citizens of part-time communities of imagination.

But these very phenomena—and their inherent connection with the expansion of what we conveniently call the West—are part of the text that reveals the dominant mood as evanescing from a Western problèmematique. The perception of a collapse as revelation cannot be envisioned outside of the trajectory of thought that has marked the West and spread unevenly outside of its expanding boundaries. Its conditions of existence coalesce within the West. The stance it spaws is unthinkable outside of the West, and has significance only within the boundaries set by the West.

If the postmodern mood is fundamentally Western in the global sense delineated above, what does this mean for an anthropology of the present? First, it means that the present that anthropologists must confront is the product of a particular past that encompasses the history and the prehistory of anthropology itself. Second and consequently, it means that the postmodernist critique within North American anthropology remains, so far, within the very thematic field that it claims to challenge. Third, it means that a truly critical and reflexive anthropology needs to contextualize the Western metanarratives and read critically the place of the discipline in the field so discovered. In short, anthropology needs to turn the apparatus elaborated in the observation of non-Western societies on itself and, more specifically, on the history from which it sprang. That history does not start with the formalization of the discipline, but with the emergence of the symbolic field that made this formalization possible.

THE SAVAGE AND THE INNOCENT

In 1492, Christopher Columbus stumbled upon the Caribbean. The admiral’s mistake would later be heralded as “The Discovery of America,” the quincentennial of which two worlds will soon celebrate. To be sure, it took Balboa’s sighting of the Pacific in 1513 to verify the existence of a continental mass, and Vespucci’s insistence on a mundus novus for Christendom to acknowledge this “discovery.” Then it took another fifty years to realize its symbolic significance. Yet 1492 was, to some extent, a discovery even then, the first material step in a continuously renewed process of invention (Ainsa 1988). Abandoning one lake for another, Europe confirmed the sociopolitical fissure that was slowly pushing the Mediterranean toward northern and southern shores. In so doing, it created itself, but it also discovered America, its still unfinished alter ego, its elsewhere, its other. The Conquest of America stands as Europe’s model for the constitution of the Other (Todorov 1982; Anzia 1989).

Yet from the beginning, the model was Janus-faced. The year 1516 saw the publication of two anthropological precursors: the Alcalá edition of the Decades of Pietro Martire d’Angiòeria (a paratopographie account of the Antilles, and in many ways one of Europe’s earliest introductions to a “state of nature” elsewhere) and one more popular edition of Amerigo Vespucci’s epistolary travel accounts. In that same year too, Thomas More published his fictional account of an “ideal state” on the island of Utopia, the prototypical nowhere of European imagination.

The chronological coincidence of these publications, fortuitous as it may be, symbolizes a thematic correspondence now blurred by intellectual specialization and the abuse of categories. We now claim to distinguish clearly between travelers’ accounts, colonial surveys, ethnographic reports, and fictional utopias. Such cataloging is useful, but only to some extent. In the early sixteenth century, European descriptions of an alleged state of nature in the realist mode filled the writings of colonial officers concerned with the immediate management of the Other. The realist mode also pervaded travelers’ accounts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, before settling in the privileged space of learned discourse with eighteenth-century philosophers and the nineteenth-century rise of armchair anthropology. Even then, the line between these genres was not always clear-cut (Thornton 1983; Weil 1984). The realist mode also
pervaded fiction—so much so that some twentieth-century critics distinguish between utopias and “extraordinary voyages,” or trips to the lands of nowhere with the most “realistic” geographical settings. On the other hand, fantasies about an ideal state increased in fiction, but they also found their way into theater, songs, and philosophical treatises.

In short, classifications notwithstanding, the connection between a state of nature and an ideal state is, to a large extent, in the symbolic construction of the materials themselves. The symbolic transformation through which Christendom became the West structures a set of relations that necessitate both utopia and the savage. What happens within the slots so created—and within the genres that condition their historical existence—is not inconsequential. But the analysis of these genres cannot explain the slots nor even the internal tropes of such slots. To wit, “utopia” has been the most studied form of this ensemble, yet there is no final agreement on which works to include in the category (Atkinson 1920, 1922; Andrews 1937; Trousson 1975; Manuel and Manuel 1979; Eliaffeldt 1982; Kamenka 1987). Further, when reached, agreement is often ephemeral. Even if one could posit a continuum from realist ethnography to fictional utopias, works move in and out of these categories, and categories often overlap on textual and nontextual grounds. Finally, textuality is rarely the final criterion of inclusion or exclusion. From the 200-year-long controversy about the Voyage et aventures de François Laguat (a 1708 best seller believed by some to be a true account and by others, a work of fiction) to the Castaño’s embarrassment to professional anthropology and the more recent debates on Sâhaba or the existence of the Tasaday, myriad cases indicate the ultimate relevance of issues outside of “the text” proper (Atkinson 1922; Weil 1984; Pratt 1986).

That the actual corpus fitting any of these genres at any given period has never been unproblematic underscores a thematic correspondence that has survived the increasingly refined categorizations. In the 1950s, readers could not fail to notice the similarities between works such as Jacques Cartier’s Brief Récit, which features paraethnographic descriptions of Indians, and some of Rabelais’s scenes in Gargantua. Montaigne, an observant traveler himself within the confines of Europe, used descriptions of America to set for his readers issues in philosophical anthropology—and in the famous essay “Des cannibales,” he is quick to point out the major difference between his enterprise and that of his Greek predecessors, including Plato: the Greeks had no realistic database (Montaigne 1952). Early in the seventeenth century, Tommaso Campanella produced his Citta del sole (1602), informed by descriptions that Portuguese missionaries and Dutch mercenaries were bringing back from Ceylon and by Jesuit reports of socialism within the Inca kingdom.

Utopias were both rare and inferior—by earlier and later standards—during the seventeenth century. Few are now remembered other than those of Campanella, Bacon, and Fénelon. But the search for an exotic ideal had not died, as some authors (Trousson 1975) seem to suggest. Fénelon’s Aventures de Télémaque went into twenty printings. The History of the Sevarties of Denis Viatasse d’Alais (1677–79) was published originally in English, then in a French version that spurred German, Dutch, and Italian translations (Atkinson 1920). Utopias did not quench the thirst for fantasy lands, but only because relative demand had increased unexpectedly.

Travel accounts, of which the numbers kept multiplying, helped fill this increased demand for the elsewhere. Some did so with reports of unicorns and floating isles, then accepted as reality by their public, including some of the most respected scholars of the time. But most did so with what were “realist” pictures of the savage, pictures that would pass twentieth-century tests of accuracy and are still being used by historians and anthropologists. Du Terré (1667), Labat (1722), and Gage (1648)—to take only a few recognizable authors writing on one hemisphere—familiarized readers with the wonders of the Antilles and the American mainland.

Outside of a restricted group of overzealous scholars and administrators, it mattered little to the larger European audience whether such works were fictitious or not. That they presented an elsewhere was enough. That the elsewhere was actually somewhere was a matter for a few specialists. The dream remained alive well into the next century. Montesquieu was so much aware of this implicit correspondence that he gambled on reversing all the traditions at the same time, with considerable aesthetic and didactic effect, in his Lettres persanes (1721). The elsewhere became Paris; the Other became French; the utopia became a well-known state of affairs. It worked, because everyone recognized the models and understood the parody.

The thematic correspondence between utopias and travel accounts or paraethnographic descriptions was not well camouflaged until the end of the eighteenth century. The forms continued to diverge, while the number of publications within each category kept increasing. Utopias filled the century that gave us the Enlightenment, from Swift’s parodic Gulliver’s Travels (1702) to Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s unfinished L’amaZONE (1795). But so did realistic descriptions of faraway peoples, and so did, moreover,
cross-national debates in Europe on what exactly those descriptions meant for the rational knowledge of humankind. In the single decade of the 1760s, England alone sent expeditions like those of Commodore Byron, Captains Cartwright, Bruce, Furneaux, and Wallis, and Lieutenant Cook to savage lands all over the world. Bruce, Wallis, and Cook brought home reports from Abyssinia, Tahiti, and Hawaii. Byron and his companions carried back accounts "of a race of splendid giants" from Patagonia. Cartwright returned with five living Eskimos who caused a commotion in the streets of London (Tinker 1922: 5–23).

Scholars devoured such "realistic" data on the savage with a still unsurpassed interest, while writing didactic utopias and exploring in their philosophical treatises the rational revelation behind the discoveries of the travelers. Voltaire, who read voraciously the travel descriptions of his time, gave us Candide and "Zadig." But he also used paraphrastic descriptions to participate in anthropological debates of his time, siding for instance with the Göttingen school on polygeny (Duchê 1971). Didierot, who may have read more travel accounts than anyone then alive, and who turned many of them in paraphrastic descriptions for the Encyclopédie, wrote two utopias true to form. Rousseau, whom Lévi-Strauss called "the father of ethnology," sought the most orderly link between "the state of nature" first described by Martine d'Anghiera and the "ideal commonwealth" envisioned by More and his followers. He thus formalized the myth of the "noble savage," renewing a theme that went back not only to Pope and Defoe, but to obscure travelers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Long before Rousseau's Social Contract, Pietro Martire already thought that the Arawak of the Antilles were sweet and simple. Magellan's companion, Pigaletta, claimed in 1522 that the Indians of Brazil were "credules et bornes" by instinct. And Pierre Boucher, writing of the Iroquois in 1664, had confirmed that "tous les Sauvageons ont l'esprit bon" (Gonnard 1946: 36; Atkinson 1920: 65–70).

The myth of the noble savage is not a creation of the Enlightenment. Ever since the West became the West, Robinson has been looking for Friday. The eighteenth century was not even the first to see arguments on or around that myth (Gonnard 1946). The verbal duel between Las Casas and Sepúlveda on the "nature" of the Indians and the justice of their enslavement, fought at Valladolid in the early 1550s in front of Spain's intellectual nobility, was as spectacular as anything the Enlightenment could imagine (André-Vincent 1980, Pagden 1982). Rather, the specificity of eighteenth-century anthropological philosophers was to dismiss some of the past limitations of this grandiose controversy and to claim to resolve it not on the basis of the Scriptures, but on the open grounds of rationality and experience. But the debate was always implicit in the thematic concordance that had tied the observation of the savage and the hopes of utopia since at least 1516. Swiss writer Isaac Israel, a leading voice of the Göttingen school of anthropology, criticized Rousseau's ideals and the state of savagery as "disorderly fantasy" (Rupp-Eisenreich 1984: 90). The fact that the Göttingen school did not much bother to verify its own "ethnographic" bases, or that it used travelers' accounts for other purposes than Rousseau's (Rupp-Eisenreich 1984), matters less than the fact that Rousseau, Israel, Meiners, and De Gerando shared the same premises on the relevance of savagery. For Rousseau, as for More and Defoe, the savage is an argument for a particular kind of utopia. For Israel and Meiners, as for Swift and Hobbes in other times and contexts, it is an argument against it. Given the tradition of the genre being used, the formal terrain of battle, and the personal taste of the author, the argument was either tacit or explicit and the savage's face either sketched or magnified. But argument there was.

The nineteenth century blurred the most visible signs of this thematic correspondence by artificially separating utopia and the savage. To schematize a protracted and contested process is: it is as if that century of specialization subdivided the Other that the Renaissance had set forth in creating the West. From then on, utopia and the savage evolved as two distinguishable slots. Kant had set the philosophical grounds for this separation by laying his own teleology without humor or fiction while moving away from the Naturinsth. Nineteenth-century French positivists, in the growing fictional literature in the United States also modified the forms of utopia (Plaether 1984). To start with, America had been the imagined site of traditional utopias, and later the scene of a "classical" the blanket, the land of all impossibilities. Defining an elsewhere from this site was a dilemma. Ideally, its Eden was within itself (Walkover 1974). Not surprisingly, William Dean Howells brings A Traveler from Altruria to the United States before sending his readers back to utopia. Edward Bellamy chose to look backward. More important, America's savages and its colonized were also within itself: American Indians and black Americans, only one of whom white anthropologists dared to study before the latter part of this century (Mintz 1971, 1990). With two groups of savages to pick from, specialization set in, and Indians (especially "good" Indians) became the preserve of anthropologists.

At the same time, a black utopia was unthinkable, given the character of North American racism and the fabric of black/white imagery in
American literature (Levin 1967). Thus the black pastoral (the unmatched apex of which is Uncle Tom's Cabin [1851]—but note that the flavor is also in Faulkner) played the role that Paul et Virginie had played earlier in European imagination. But true-to-form utopia writers in North America moved away from the specter of savagery.

Other factors were at play. The nineteenth century was America's century of concreteness, when its utopias became reachable. Of the reported 52 million migrants who left Europe between 1824 and 1924, more than ninety percent went to the Americas, mostly to the United States. In the United States, and in Europe as well, decreasing exchange among writers, who were involved in different forms of discourse and seeking legitimacy on different grounds, contributed even more to giving each group of practitioners the sentiment that they were carrying on a different enterprise. As they believed their practice and practiced their beliefs, the enterprises indeed became separated, but only to a certain extent. By the end of the nineteenth century, utopian novelists accentuated formal interests while utopianisms were acknowledged primarily as doctrines couched in non-fictional terms: Saint-Simonian, Fabian Socialism, Marxism (Gonnard 1946). Travel accounts came to pass as a totally separate genre, however Robinson-like some remained. The "scientific" study of the savage qua savage became the privileged field of academic anthropology, soon to be anchored in distinguished chairs, but already severed from its imaginary counterpart.

The rest of the story is well known, perhaps too well known, inasmuch as the insistence on the methods and tropes of anthropology as discipline may obscure the larger discursive order that made sense of its institutionalization. Histories that fail to problematize this institutionalization—and critiques premised on that naive history—necessarily fall short of illuminating the enunciative context of anthropological discourse. To be sure, anthropologists to this day keep telling both undergraduates and lay readers that their practice is useful to better understand "ourselves," but without ever spelling exactly the specifics of this understanding, the utopians behind this curiosity turned profession.

It has often been said that the savage or the primitive was the alter ego the West constructed for itself. What has not been emphasized enough is that this Other was a Janus, of whom the savage was only the second face. The first face was the West itself, but the West fancifully constructed as a utopian projection and meant to be, in that imaginary correspondence, the condition of existence of the savage.

This thematic correspondence preceded the institutionalization of an-
or as challenge to it—that is, as a universalist project, the boundaries of which were no-where, ut-topus, non-spatial. And that, one needs to repeat, is not a product of the Enlightenment, but part and parcel of the horizon set by the Renaissance and its simultaneous creation of Europe and otherness, without which the West is inconceivable. Thomas More did not have to wait for ethnographic reports on the Americas to compose his Utopia. Similarly, eighteenth-century readers of travel accounts did not wait for verification. Even today, there is a necessary gap between the initial acceptance of the most fanciful "ethnographies" and the "restudied" or "reassesments" that follow. The chronological precedence reflects a deeper inequality in the two faces of Janus: the utopian West is first in the construction of this complementarity. It is the first observed face of the figure, the initial projection against which the savage becomes a reality. The savage makes sense only in terms of utopia.

THE MEDIATION OF ORDER

Utopia itself made sense only in terms of the absolute order against which it was projected, negatively or not.* Utopias do not necessarily advance foundational propositions, but they feed upon foundational thoughts. Fictio

Tional "ideal states," presented as novels or treatises, suggest a project or a counterproject. It is this very projection, rather than their alleged or proven fanciful characteristics, that makes them utopias. Here again, we need to go back to the Renaissance, that fictional rebirth through which Christendom became the West, where two more snapshots may clarify the issue.

From the point of view of contemporaries, the most important event of the year 1492 was not Columbus's landing in the Antilles, but the conquest of the Muslim kingdom of Granada and its incorporation into Castile (Trouillot 1990). The gap between the three religions of Abraham had paralleled the sociopolitical fissure that split the Mediterranean, but because of that fissure, religious intolerance increasingly expressed itself in ways that intertwined religion, ethnicity, territory, and matters of state control. To put it simply, as Christendom became Europe, Europe itself became Christian. It is no accident that the fall of Muslim Granada was immediately followed by the expulsion of the Jews from the now Christian territory. It is no accident either that the very same individual who signed the public order against the Jews also signed Ferdinand and Isabella's secret instructions to Columbus. Indeed, nascent Europe could turn its eyes to the Atlantic only because the consolidation of political borders and the concentration of political power in the name of the Christian God presaged the advent of internal order.

Order—political and ideological—was high on the agenda, both in theory and in practice, and the increased use of the printing press stimulated the interchange between theory and practice. Thus, in 1513, three years before Thomas More's Utopia, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote The Prince. In retrospect, that work signified a threshold's some leaders of the emerging Western world were ready to phrase the issue of control in terms of realpolitik long before the word was coined. The Machiavellian era encompassed Erasmus's Education of a Christian Prince, Rude's Education of a Prince, and other treatises that shared an "emphasis on the workable rather than the ideal," a belief that "men's destinies were to some extent within their own control and that this control depended upon self-knowledge" (Hale 1977: 305).

* The seminal writings that inscribed savagery, utopia, and order were conceived in the same era. This simultaneity is but one indication that these slots were created against the backdrop of another. In the context of Europe, the works that set up these slots were part of an emerging debate that tied order to the quest for universal truths, a quest that gave savagery and utopia their relevance. Looking above the issue of the ideal state of affairs, and tying it to that of the state of nature, was the issue of order as both a goal and a means, and of its relation with reason and justice. Campanella's City, the runner-up to Utopia in the critics' view, clearly engaged some of Machiavelli's proposals and those of contemporary Spanish philosophers (Manuel and Manuel 1979: 261–88). Campanella, like More, also wrote in fictional modes. He commented on European political regimes, in terms of their ultimate justification. He proposed to various European monarchs a nonfictional plan of rule based on his religious and philosophical views. Indeed, the opinions expressed in his treatises got him thrown into a Spanish jail, where he wrote his fictionalized utopia (Manuel and Manuel 1979; Trousson 1975: 39, 72–78). Sir Thomas More, in turn, was executed.

The relation between fictionalized utopias and matters of political power goes way back to the ancestral forms of the genre in ancient Greece (Trousson 1975: 39). So do debates on the nature of otherness. But we need not take the naive history of the West at face value: Greece did not beget Europe. Rather, Europe claimed Greece. The revisionist historiography through which the Renaissance turned Christendom into Europe and gave it its Greek heritage is itself a phenomenon that needs to be placed in history. The distinctiveness of the Renaissance was, in part, the
invention of a past for the West. As was also, in part, an emerging claim to universality and to an absolute order inconceivable without that claim. As Las Casas, Montesquieu, and Montaigne were quick to point out in different terms and times, a major difference between Europe and ancient Greece was the reality of the savage as experienced by Europe after 1492. Unlike that of Greece and Rome, or that of the Islamic world, the West's vision of order implied from its inception two complementary spaces, the here and the elsewhere, which premised one another and were conceived as inseparable.

In imaginary terms that elsewhere could be utopia; but in the concrete terms of conquest, it was a space of colonization peopled by others who would eventually become "us"—or at the very least who should—in a project of assimilation antithetic to the most liberal branches of Greek philosophy. In that sense, order had become universal, absolute—both in the shape of the rising absolutist state (quite opposed, indeed, to Greek democracy), and in the shape of a universal empire stretching the limits of Christendom out into nowhere. Colonization became a mission, and the savage became absence and negation. The symbolic process through which the West created itself thus involved the universal legitimacy of power—and order became, in that process, the answer to the question of legitimacy. To put it otherwise, the West is inconceivable without a rectilinearization, for since their common emergence in the sixteenth century, both the modern state and colonization posited—and continue to pose—to the West the idea of the philosophical base of order. As Edmond Glissant (1949: 2) phrases it: "The West is not in the West. It is a project, not a place," a multilayered enterprise in transparent universality.

Chronological convergences again illustrate the point. At about the same time Machiavelli wrote The Prince, the Spanish Crown made known its supplementary laws on American colonization, and the Medici clan in 1513 secured the papacy with the nomination of Leo X—the same Leo, bishop of Rome, to whom Pietro Martire dedicated parts of his ethnography. Two years later, the accession of Francis I as king of France signalled the self-conscious invention of the traditions constitutive of the French nation-state—a self-consciousness manifested in the imposed use of the French dialect and the creation of the Collège de France. One year after Francis's advent, Charles I (later Charles V) became king of Castile and of its New World possessions, and Martin Luther published the theses of Wittenberg. The second decade of the new century ended quite fortuitously with a semblance of victory on the side of order, that is, with

Charles's "election" to the imperial crown in 1519. But the condemnation of Luther (1520), rural agitation within Castile itself, and the so-called Oriental menace (culminating with the 1529 siege of Vienna by the Turks) kept reminding a nascent Europe that its self-delivery was not to happen without pains. The notion of a universal empire that would destroy, through its ineluctable expansion, the borders of Christendom became both more attractive in thought and more unattainable in practice. The fictionalized utopias that immediately followed More's and overlapped with the practical reshaping of power in a newly defined Europe were by and large reformist rather than revolutionary, hardly breaking new imaginary ground (Trousson 1975: 62–72). This is not surprising, for, just as the savage is in an unequal relationship with utopia, so is utopia in an uneven relation with order. Just as the savage is a metaphorical argument for or against utopia, so is utopia (and the savage it encompasses) a metaphorical argument for or against order, conceived of as an expression of legitimate universality. It is the mediation of universal order, as the ultimate signified of the savage-utopia relation, that gives the triad its full sense. In defense of a particular vision of order, the savage became evidence for a particular type of utopia. That the same ethnographic source could be used to make the opposite point did not matter, beyond a minimal requirement for verisimilitude. To be sure, Las Casas had been there. Sepúlveda had not; and this helped the case of the procurador. To be sure, the Rousseausists were right and Wittenberg was wrong about cranial sizes. To be sure, the empirical verdict is not yet in on the Passaday. But now as before, the savage is only evidence within a debate, the importance of which surpasses not only his understanding but his very existence. Just as utopia itself can be offered as a promise or as a dangerous illusion, the Savage can be noble, wise, barbarian, victim, or aggressor, depending on the debate and the aims of the interlocutors. The space within the slot is not static, and its changing contents are not predetermined by its structural position. Regional and temporal variants of the savage figure abound, in spite of recurring tendencies that suggest geographical specialization. Too often, anthropological discourse modifies the projection of nonacademic observers only to the extent that it "disciplines" them. At other times, anthropologists help create and buttress images that can question previous permutations. Thus, what happens within the slot is neither doomed nor inconceivable (Fox, this volume; Vincent, this volume). The point is, rather, that a critique of anthropology cannot skirt around this slot. The direction of the discipline now depends
rect, together they expose the unspoken assumptions of postmodernist anthropology in North America and reveal its inherent limitations. For the portrait of the postmodernist anthropologist that emerges from this dual exercise is not a happy one indeed. Cameraman and notebook in hand, he is looking for the savage, but the savage has vanished.

The problem starts with the dated inheritance of the moderns themselves. The world that the anthropologist inherits has wiped out the empirical trace of the savage-object. Coke bottles and cartridges now obscure the familiar tracks. To be sure, one could reinvent the savage, or create new savages within the West itself—solutions of this kind are increasingly appealing. The very notion of a pristine savagery, however, is now awkward, irrespective of the savage-object. Lingerings of conditions of modernity make the notion a hard one to evoke in imagination, now that bottles of savages have joined the slums of the Third World or touched the shores of the West. We are far from the days when five Eskimos caused an uproar in London. The primitive has become terrorist, refugee, freedom fighter, opium and crack smoker, or parasite. He can even play anthropologist at times. Filmed documentaries show his "real" conditions of existence; underground newspapers expose his dreams of modernity. Thanks to modernity, the savage has changed, the West has changed, and the West knows that both have changed empirically.

But modernity is only part of the anthropologist's difficulty. Modern obstacles have modern (technical) answers, or so we used to think. The more serious issue is that technical solutions do not suffice anymore. At best, they can solve the problem of the empirical object by removing the Cokes and cartridges. At worst, they can fabricate an entire new face for savagery. But they cannot remedy the loss of the larger thematic field especially since the savage never dominated this field. He was only one of the requisite parts of a tripartite relation, the mask of a mask. The problem is not simply that the masks are torn, that true cannibals are now rare. The problem is that now—as in Norman Mailer's Cannibals and Christians (1966)—both are equally good, or equally evil (Walliser 1974), if evil itself can be defined (Lotzard 1986).

This is altogether a postmodern quandary. It is part of the world of constructs and relations revealed by postmodernism. It is an intrinsic dilemma of postmodern anthropology. For if indeed foundational thoughts are seen as collapsing, if indeed utopias are arguments about order and foundational thoughts, and if indeed the savage exists primarily within an implicit correspondence with utopia, the specialist in savagery is in dire straits. (He does not know what to aim at. His favorite model has disappeared or, when found, refuses to pose as expected. The

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**Figure 2.1.** The symbolic organization of the savage slot, ca. 1515–1990.

upon an explicit attack on that slot itself and the symbolic order upon which it is premised (fig. 2.1). For as long as the slot remains, the savage is at best a figure of speech, a metaphor in an argument about nature and the universe, about being and existence—in short, an argument about foundational thought.

**PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A BUBBLE**

This brings us right back to the present. I have argued so far that to historicize the West is to historicize anthropology and vice versa. I have further suggested that the postmodern condition makes that two-pronged historicization both urgent and necessary. If these two arguments are cor-
fieldworker examines his tools and finds his camera inadequate. Most importantly, his very field of vision now seems blurred. Yet he needs to come back home with a picture. It's pouring rain out there, and the mosquitoes are starting to bite. In desperation, the baffled anthropologist burns his notes to create a moment of light, moves his face against the flame, closes his eyes, and, hands grasping the camera, takes a picture of himself.

**TACTICS AND STRATEGY**

Lest this portrait be taken to characterize the postmodernist anthropologist as the epitome of self-indulgence (as many critics, indeed, imply), let me say that narcissist labels characterize postmodernist anthropologists, as individuals, no better than they typify their predecessors or adversaries. Intellectuals as a group claimed and gained socially sanctioned self-indulgence long before postmodernism. Individual intent is secondary here. At any rate, anthropology's postmodern situation warrants more sober reflection than petty accusations of egomania across theoretical camps.

I may end up being both more lenient and more severe—thus risking the condemnation of foes and proponents alike—by saying that the perceived self-indulgence of the postmodernist anthropologists inheres in the situation itself. That is what makes it so obvious and such an easy target for opponents. If we take seriously the perception of an ongoing collapse of the Western metanarratives, the vacuum created by the fall of the house of reason in the once fertile fields of utopian imagination, and the empirical destruction of the savage-object, then the anthropologist who is aware of the postmodern situation has no target outside of himself (as witness) and his text (as pretext), within the thematic universe he inherits.

Once phrased in these terms, the dilemma becomes manageable. One obvious solution is to confront and change the thematic field itself and claim new grounds for anthropology—which is just what some anthropologists have been doing, though without explicit programs. But the dilemma, as lived by the postmodernists, is no less real, and the epiphany of textuality cannot be reduced to a mere aggregate of individual tactics of self-aggrandizement or preservation. If electoral politics may explain either overstatements or the craving for new fads in North American anthropology and elsewhere, they say little of the mechanisms leading to specific choices among myriad possibilities. Why the text? Why the sudden (for anthropologists, to some extent) rediscovery of literature, and of some literature at that? However much the (re)discovery of textuality and

authorial legitimation may be associated with mid-term maneuvers, it also must be seen in another context. In that context—the thematic field delineated by order, utopia, and the savage—this emphasis on textuality represents a strategic retreat triggered by the perception of ongoing destruction. In other words, electoral politics alone cannot explain postmodernist anthropology. To propose viable alternatives, one needs to take the ideological and theoretical context of postmodernism seriously, more seriously than the postmodernists do themselves. One needs also to take more seriously both literary criticism and philosophy.

**METAPHORS IN ETHNOGRAPHY AND ETHNOGRAPHY AS METAPHOR**

The recent discovery of textuality by North American anthropologists is based on a quite limited notion of the text. The emphasis on the independent importance of ethnographic writing as a genre (Marcus 1980: 507), the dismissal of pre-text, con-text, and content, all contribute to reading the anthropological product as isolated from the larger field in which its conditions of existence are generated. Passage references aside, the course of inquiry on the relations among anthropology, colonialism, and political "neutrality," which opened in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Asad 1973), is now considered closed, because it allegedly revealed all its partial truths. Passing mentions of gender aside, feminism—as a discourse that claims the specificity of (some) historical subjects—is bypassed because it is said to deal only with "content." Passing references to the Third World notwithstanding, the issues raised by Wolf's historicization of the Other (1982), an inquiry that inherently makes anthropology part of this changing world, are considered moot. Mentions of relations of textual production notwithstanding, the mechanisms and processes emphasized are those that singularize the voice of anthropology, as if anthropological discourse was either self-enclosed or self-sufficient.

Not surprisingly, the archaeological exploration that underpins the North American exercise in reflexivity tends to stop at the institutionalization of anthropology as a discipline in the Anglophone world, or at best at the delineation of a specialized anthropological discourse in the Europe of the Enlightenment. In spite of the professed renunciation of labels, boundaries are set in modern terms to produce a history of the discipline, albeit one with different emphases. The construction exposed is a discursive order within anthropology, not the discursive order within which anthropology operates and makes sense—even though, here again, this larger field seems to warrant passing mention. The representational
aspect of ethnographic discourse is attacked with a vigor quite disproportional to the referential value of ethnographies in the wider field within which anthropology finds its significance. In short, to use a language that still has its validity, the object of inquiry is the "simple" rather than the "enlarged" reproduction of anthropological discourse. Terminology and citations notwithstanding, the larger thematic field on which anthropology is premised is barely scratched.

But if we take seriously the proposition to look at the anthropology as metaphor—as I think we can, given the thematic field outlined—we cannot just look at metaphors in anthropology. The study of "ethnographic allegory" (Clifford 1986b; Tyler 1986) cannot be taken to refer primarily to allegorical forms in ethnography without losing site of the larger picture. Our starting point cannot be "a crisis in anthropology" (Clifford 1986a:3), but in the histories of the world. We need to go out of anthropology to see the construction of "ethnographic authority" not as a late requirement of anthropological discourse (Clifford 1983b) but as an early component of this wider field that is itself constitutive of anthropology. Would that the power of anthropology hinged upon the academic success of genial immigrants such as Franz Boas and Bronislaw Malinowski! It would allow us to find new scapegoats without ever looking back at the Renaissance. But the exercise in reflexivity must go all the way and examine fully the enlarged reproduction of anthropological discourse.

Observers may wonder why the postmodernist experiment in U.S. anthropology has not encouraged a surge of substantive models. The question of time aside, the difficulty of passing from criticism to substance is not simply due to a theoretical aversion to content or an instinctive suspicion of exemplars. After all, the postmodern wave has revitalized substantive production in other academic fields. It has stimulated architects and political theorists alike. At the very least, it has provoked debates on and of substance. Further, some political radicals advocate the possibility of militant practices rooted in postmodernism—although not without controversies (Lacan from anti-postmodernism and of specific monographs when we remove this slot—not to revolutionize disciplinary tradition through cosmetic surgery, but to build both an epistemology and a semiotics of what anthropologists have done and can do. We cannot simply assume that modernism has exhausted all its potential projects. Nor can we assume that "realist ethnography" has produced nothing but empty figures of speech and shallow claims to authority.

Second, armed with this renewed arsenal, we can recapture domains of significance by creating strategic points of "reentry" into the discourse on "otherness" areas within the discourse where the introduction of new voices or new combinations of meaning perturb the entire field and open the way to its (partial) recapture. This chapter is not the place to expand in the directions of these many queries, so I can only tease the
reader. But a few tasks seem to me urgent in this new context: an epistemo-
logical reassessment of the historical subject (the first person singular
that has been overwhelmed by the voice of objectivity or by that of the
narrator and that is so important to many feminists, especially Afro-
American feminists); a similar reassessment of naivete and naive dis-
course, now barely conceptualized; and a theory of ethnography, now
repudiated as the new "false consciousness." And for the time being, at
least, we need more ethnographies that raise these issues through con-
crete cases. Not so much ethnographies that question the author/native
dichotomy by exposing the nude as nakedness, but ethnographies (ethno-
historio-semiologies?) that offer new points of reentry by questioning the
symbolic world upon which "naivete" is premised. At the very least, anthropologists can show that the Other, here and elsewhere, is indeed a
product—symbolic and material—of the same process that created the
West. In short, the time is ripe for substantive propositions that aim
explicitly at the destruction of the savage slot.

That it has not been so among the postmodernists of North American
anthropology is thus a matter of choice. In spite of a terminology that
intimates a decoding of "anthropology as metaphor," we are barely read-
ingly anthropology itself. Rather, we are reading anthropological pages, and
attention remains focused narrowly on the metaphors in anthropology.
This recurring refusal to pursue further the archaeological exercise ob-
sures the asymmetrical position of the savage-Other in the thematic field
upon which anthropology was premised. It negates the specificity of oth-
erness, subsuming the Other in the sameness of the text perceived as
liberating cooperation. "We are the world?"

Anthropology did not create the savage. Rather, the savage was the
raison d'être of anthropology. Anthropology came to fill the savage slot in
the ideology order-utopia-savagery, a trilogy which preceded anthropolo-
y's institutionalization and gave it continuing coherence in spite of in-
tradisciplinary shifts. This trilogy is now in jeopardy. Thus the time is
ripe—and in that sense, it is postmodern—to attack frontally the visions
that shaped this trilogy, to uncover its ethical roots and its consequences,
and to find better anchors for an anthropology of the present, an anthro-
pology of the changing world and its irreducible histories. But postmod-
ernist anthropologists pass near this opportunity looking for the savage in
the text. They want us to read the internal tropes of the savage slot, no
doubt a useful exercise in spite of its potential for self-indulgence. But
they refuse to address directly the thematic field (and thus the larger
world) that made (makes) this slot possible, monoply preserving the
empty slot itself.

Times have changed since the sixteenth century: one now is innocent
until proven guilty. Thus, claims of innocence can take the shape of si-
ence. Somehow, to my surprise, I miss the faithful indignation of a Las
Casas.

Notes

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4. For reasons of space, I cannot retrace here all the connections between
recent debates in philosophy and literary theory and recent critiques of anthro-
pology. Our readings are too parochial, anyway—to the point that any major
thinker needs to be translated into the discipline by an insider. Anthropology has
much more to learn from other disciplines, notably history, literary criticism,
and philosophy, than the reflexivists interpreters assume. There are blanks to be
filled by the reader with proper use of the bibliographical references.

2. Other reasons aside, long-term fieldwork in the so-called Third World,
after the initial dissertation, is becoming more difficult and less rewarding for a
majority of anthropologists. Unfortunately, issues such as the increased com-
petition for funds to do fieldwork abroad or the growing proportion of two-career
families in and out of academe only make good conversation. Practitioners tend
to dismiss them in written (and therefore "serious") assessments of trends in the
discipline. The sociology of our practice is perceived as taboo, but see Wolf
(1969), whose early appeal for such a sociology fell on deaf ears, and Rabinow
(this volume).

3. In that sense, I take exception to Renato Rosaldo's formulation that the
conservative domination "has distorted a once-healthy debate" (Rosaldo 1980:
223). What a certain kind of anthropology can demonstrate is exactly that the
debate was never as healthy as we were led to believe.

(1986), and Harvey (1989) on conflicting definitions of postmodernism. I am not
qualified to settle this debate. But if postmodernism only means a style, a
bundle of expository devices, characterized (or not) by "double coding" (Jencks
1986), then it does not matter much to anthropologists—as long as they note
that double coding has been part of the cultural arsenal of many non-Western
cultures for centuries. On the connection between postmodernism and meta-
narratives, see Lyardt (1979, 1980), Eagleton (1987), and Harvey (1989).

5. The first consists of two chapters in Les Rêves indiens. The second is the
instantic Supplément au voyage du Bougainville, a primitivist utopia where Tahiti is the Other in more than one way, being both savage and female (Trousson 1975: 140, Brewer 1985).

6. I owe my ideas on the black or plantation pastoral to conversations with Professor Maximilien Laroche and access to his unpublished paper on the subject. In Bernard Saint-Pierre's successful Paul et Virginie (1787), whose setting is a plantation island, a group of maroon slaves surprises the two lovers, but to the heroes' amazement, the chief of the runaway slaves says, "Good little whites, don't be afraid; we saw you pass this morning with a negro woman from Rivière-Noire; you went to ask her grace to her bad master, in gratitude, we will carry you back home on our shoulders."

7. Some writers have made this point. Others have assembled the necessary information to make it, without always drawing the same conclusion from their juxtapositions. I have read over the shoulders of so many of them, and imposed my reading on so many others, that credits for this section and the next were sometimes difficult to attribute in the main text, but see Atkinson (1920, 1922, 1924), Baudet (1959), Chinard (1934), Duchêne (1971), De Certeau (1975), Gonnard (1946), Todorov (1982), Trousson (1973), Rupp-Eisenreich (1984), and Drieux and Gossiaux (1985).

8. My phrasing of this issue in terms of order owes to conversations with Astraf Ghani. I remain responsible for its use here and its possible shortcomings. Empirical elements of an analysis of the role of order within the symbolic horizons of the Renaissance are plentiful in Hale's Renaissance Europe: Individual and Society, 1480–1520 (Hale 1957).

9. Genealogies that trace the beginnings of anthropology to Herodotus (why not Ibn Battuta?) partake of that naive history. They serve the guild interests of the "discipline," its construction of tradition, authorship, and authority and the reproduction of the savage slot upon which it builds its legitimacy. Note, however, that it was only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that Romantics and racists abandoned the ancient Greeks' own version of their cultural origins, denying the contributions of Africans and Semites to "civilization." Classical studies then invented a new past for Greece with an Aryan model (Bernal 1987).

10. From then on, descriptions of savagery would inscribe grammatically the absence in a way now all too familiar (and unquestioned) by anthropologists. The savage is what the West is not: "no manner of traffic, no knowledge of letters, no science of numbers ... no contract, no successions, no dividends, no properties ..." (Montaigne 1592: 94). This language is quite different from that of Poli (1958) or even from that of Plato. But its immediate antecedents are in the very first descriptions of the Americas: Columbus, for instance, thought the "Indians" had "no religion"—by which he probably meant "none of the three religions of Abraham."

11. One cannot say that Freire I consciously foresaw a French nation-state in the modern sense, but the absolutist order he envisioned revealed itself historically untenable without the invented tradition necessary for the symbolic construction of the nation. It is only by one of those ironies of which history is full that this tradition became fully alive at the time of the Revolution and was solidified by a Corsican mercenary with no claim to Frankish nobility, namely, Napoleon Buonaparte.

12. One suspects that the savage as wise is more often than not Asiatic, the savage as noble is often a Native American, and the savage as barbarian is often African or African-American. But neither roles nor positions are always neat, and the structural dichotomies do not always obtain historically. Jews and Gypsies, for instance, are savages "within" the West—an awkward position not accounted by the here/elsewhere dichotomy, but resolved in practice by perspecution.

13. Anthropological insistence on, say, rebellion and resistance in Latin America, economiser qua material survival in Africa, or ritual expression in Southeast Asia parallels of a symbolic distribution that predates chronologically and precedes epistemologically the division of labor within the discipline. A major limitation of the work of Edward Said is the failure to read "Orientalism" as one set of permutations within the savage slot. My greater familiarity with Caribbean anthropology may explain why I find most of my positive examples in this corner of the world, but it is obvious to Caribbeanists that anthropology helped challenge the vision of the Antilles as islands in the sun peopled by indolent natives—a view popularized since the nineteenth century by racist yet celebrated writers such as Anthony Trollope (1859). How successful was the challenge is another issue, but forty years before "voodoo economics" became a pejorative slogan in North American political parlance, some North American and European anthropologists took Haitian popular religion quite seriously (e.g., Herskovits 1937).

15. To be sure, in its current form, the alleged discovery of the text provokes transient hyperboles. We all knew that ethnohistory was also text if only because of the ARDS relegated to driving cabs when their lives could not see the light of day, or because of the careers destroyed when dissertations failed to sprout "publishable" books (the text/test par excellence?). That Marcus and Cushman (1982: 27) "for simplicity ... do not consider the very interesting relationship between the production of a published ethnohistoric text and its intermediate written versions" is not novel. Tenure committees have been doing, the same for years, also "for simplicity," while we all continued to ignore politely the electoral politics that condition academic success.

16. See Clifford's (1986: 21) indulgent neglect of feminism on purely textual grounds. "It has not produced either unconventional forms of writing or a developed reflection on ethnographic sexuality as such." Never mind that feminism now sustains one of the most potent discourses on the specificity of the historical subject and, by extension, on the problem of "voice." To be sure, some white middle-class women, especially in the United States, want to make that new-foudn "voice" universal, and their feminist enterprise threatens to become a new
metanarrative, akin to Fanon's Third-World-ism, or Black Power à la 1960. But it is at the very least awkward for Clifford to dismiss feminist and "non-Western writings" for having made their impact on issues of content alone.

17. In fact, I doubt that there is a crisis in anthropology as such; rather, there is a crisis in the world that anthropology assumes.

18. The limited exercises of the postmodernists would take on new dimensions if used to look at the enlarged reproduction of anthropology. For example, were we to rekindle the notion of genre to read ethnography (Marcus 1980), we would need to speculate either a metanarrative (the retrospective classification of a critique), or the sanction of a receiving audience of non-specialists, or a thematic and ideological framework in the form of an anti-textual field (Genette, Jauss, and Schaffer, 1980). To speak of any of these in relation to ethnography as genre would illustrate enlarged reproduction and re-examine anthropology's own grounds.

19. I thank Eric Wolf for forcing me to make this important distinction.

20. The matter of the status of "halfies" (approached by Abu-Lughod in this volume) can be further analyzed in these terms. We need not fall into nativism in order to raise epistemological questions about the effect of historically accumulated experience, the "historical surplus value" that specific groups of subjects-as-practitioners bring to a discipline premised on the existence of the savage slot and the commensurability of others. At the same time, for philosophical and political reasons, I am profoundly opposed to the formulas of the type "add native, stir, and proceed as usual," so successful in electoral politics in and out of academe. Anthropology needs something more fundamental than reconstructive surgery, and halfies, women, people of color, etc., deserve something better than a new slot.

21. The symbolic reappropriation that Christianity imposed on Judaism, or that liberation theology is imposing on Christianity in some areas of the world, the recreation that the ecology movement has injected into notions of "survival", the redirection that feminism has imposed on issues of gender, and Marx's perturbation of classical political economy form within are all unexampled of "reentry" and recapture.

22. The anthropology of agricultural commodities as material and symbolic boundaries between human groups (along the lines opened by Mintz 1983b), the anthropology of the categories and institutions that affect and organize power—such as "peasants," "nation," "science," (Trouillot 1988, 1990, 1990; Martin 1987) or the "West" itself (to renew with both Benveniste [1969] and Foucault), the anthropology of the transnational media and other forms of communication shaping the international organization of symbols—all can be fruitfully conceptualized within such a scheme.

THE cutting edge of anthropology in the 1980s lay with criticism: historical, on the one hand, and textual, on the other. Criticism's chief characteristic, in both its postmodern and postmarxist forms, has been unsetlement, or "crisis", its goals, displacement and the assertion of new orthodoxy. Yet its perception of temporal and emergent structuring within anthropology tended to render it at once timeless and anachronistic. It lacked a sense of "discontinuous histories."

This essay is a reading of one moment in the 1980s, written in the context of rethinking historicism. I argue that anthropology must be both critical and attuned to the politics of its history. First, I sketch out what is involved in rethinking historicism, applying its commitments first to ethnographic texts conceived as process and then to today's critical moment in anthropology. In the 1960s, anthropology provided a transfer point among the humanities, a position occupied in the 1980s by literary criticism. I ask what happened, and suggest why this needs to be anthropology's concern right now. Finally, I attempt to show how the rehistoricization of an earlier era in anthropology allows us to repossess the past to talk to the present and future.